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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

CRIMINAL LAW
Some Observations on the Beck Case. State v. Beck' confronted
the Washington Supreme Court with the joint problems of delineating
the function of the grand jury and the protections required to be
afforded those who appear in a grand jury proceeding.
The appellant was formerly president of the Western Conference
of Teamsters and from 1952 to 1957 was president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. He was indicted after a grand jury
hearing for grand larceny by embezzlement The indictment charged
that a 1952 Cadillac automobile belonging to the Western Conference
of Teamsters was sold under the appellant's authorization and that
the proceeds of the sale were deposited in the appellant's personal account. The trial jury returned a verdict of guilty. On appeal it was
alleged that various errors in the grand jury proceeding compelled
reversal. Other grounds were also indicated.'
The appeal resulted in affirmance of the conviction by an evenly
divided court, one judge abstaining.4 Four judges5 adopted the position that errors in the grand jury proceeding (if there were any), once
' 155 Wash. Dec. 565, 349 P.2d 387 (1960).
2 The grand jury which returned the indictment was convened on May 20, 1957. In
March of that year Mr. Beck appeared before the Senate Rackets Investigating Committee at which time charges of misconduct were leveled at him. Mr. Beck declined
to answer questions of the committee and asserted his privilege under the fifth amendment. Presumably because Mr. Beck was the principal witness at the committee
hearings during this time and was therefore interesting viewing for the homefolk, the
hearings were televised live into the Seattle area. Other news media, ever alert to
keep the citizenry informed, displayed prominent headlines describing the event. This
publicity continued up until the time the grand jury was convened. National newsmagazines also devoted space to the activities. One significant title read "A City
Ashamed-Dave Beck is on Seattle's Conscience." Time, May, 27, 1957. As a result
of this attention, few people were unaware that Mr. Beck's affairs and those of the
union were being investigated and that accusations were being aimed at both. From
the outset there were factors operating in the Beck case which exerted uncommon
pressure on our whole scheme of administering criminal justice.
3 Of the numerous assignments of error discussed in the opinion only those relating
to the grand jury proceedings will be discussed in this Note.
4 The affirmance by an evenly divided court raises interesting questions. First, it is
doubtful if the case should have validity as precedent. The United States Supreme
Court has declared its position with respect to this situation in United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942). There the Court said that a case disposed of by an evenly divided
court resulted in affirmance of the decision appealed from but that the case would not
be considered authoritative. The Washington court is of course free to grant whatever
credence it wishes to the Beck case, but the idea expressed in Pink provides an influential argument that succors stamina from its precedental value. Second, it is to be
noted that doubt, sufficient to merit a re-hearing, existed as to whether a decision by
an evenly divided court even operated as affirmance in Washington. Rehearing granted
156 Wash. Dec. 294 (1960). Aff'd on rehearing 156 Wash. Dec. 334, 353 P.2d 429
(1960) (without opinion).
5 The four judges voting for affirmance will subsequently be referred to herein as
the majority although technically the term is inaccurate. The four judges voting for
reversal will be referred to as the dissenters.
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the grand jury had been properly selected, were immaterial since the
appellant's rights were fully protected by the subsequent fair trial.
The function of the grand jury was defined by them to be that of an
inquisitorial body, used for investigative purposes to assist a prosecutor. Bias and prejudice were declared to be insufficient grounds for
quashing a grand jury indictment or setting aside the verdict of the
petit jury after trial. Misconduct by the prosecution, not amounting
to interference with grand jury deliberations was said not to be violative of the appellant's rights. The reasoning of the majority is anchored to the idea that one accused of a crime in Washington has no
right to a grand jury hearing because a constitutional provision' authorizes the prosecution to proceed by information if it elects to do
so." Accordingly, errors in a grand jury proceeding do not prejudice
an accused because charges based on an information could have been
brought without invoking a grand jury.
The four judges voting for reversal felt that once the election to
proceed by grand jury indictment had been made the accused had
a right to a fair and impartial hearing. The charge of the court
impaneling the grand jury and the conduct of the prosecution were
thought to be prejudicial. They also felt that the statutes8 of this
state necessarily compelled an impartial grand jury.'
The institution of the grand jury is of ancient origin. Its first developing stages have baffled even the most meticulous historians.' The
debate whether the idea developed from ancient Roman law," whether
it was a Norman institution introduced into England by William the
Conqueror, 2 or whether it developed in England out of Anglo-Saxon
institutions," has never been settled. There is general agreement,
however, that the modern grand jury, that is, the practice'of having
aWAsH.
7

CONST. art. I § 25.
The dissenters thought this to be immaterial. 155 Wash. Dec. at 619. 349 P.2d

at 418.
8RCW 10.28.030; RCW 10.28.140. See notes 63 and 66 infra.

o The two opinions are indicative of fundamentally different philosophies among
members of the court. For example, the majority declared that the elements of procedural due process are not applicable to the procedures by which a grand jury reached
an indictment. 155 Wash. Dec. at 574, 349 P.2d at 392. Throughout the opinion runs
the idea that the accused had suffiient protection already, and that modernly the real
problem is convicting the guilty, although innocent parties suffer harassment. The dissenters thought that these views represented erosion of the idea that men are presumed
innocent until the prosecution proves them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 155 Wash.
Dec. at 615, 349 P.2d at 416. Consequently we find the Washington court straddling a
question dealing with one of the most basic aspects of our judicial system.
10 FORsysH, TRIAL BY JuRY 1-2 (1875).
111 POLLACK & MAITLAND, HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 141 (2d ed. 1899).
12 EDWARDs, THE GwN JuRy 2 (1906).

13 Ibid.
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a body, usually composed of seventeen to twenty-three members of
the community, inquire of and present accuations, was first established in the reign of Edward III in the fourteenth century. 4 Sometime thereafter the practice of using two juries crystallized. 5 Thus
we see that the institution later called the petit jury evolved from,
and was preceded in historical development by the grand jury.' The
grand jury, serving as an instrument of the crown to ferret out crime
came to be an independent body, standing between the crown and
the people in defense of the liberty of the citizen." This result occurred because members of a community were reluctant to accuse
others in their group without just cause." Eventually, the grand jury
became virtually autonomous. The jurors voted in secret; they were
not required to reveal the reasons for their decision; and their procedures were for the most part uncontrolled. Continued evolution of
the petit jury facilitated this movement, since common law judges had
no real reason to interrogate grand jurors with respect to how or why
they reached a decision.' The accusation presented by them neither
determined the truth nor the falsity of the charge investigated; that
decision was left to the petit jury. The judge's ire was reserved for
petit jurors if a result was contrary to his idea of "justice."
With the settlement of America by Englishmen, the institution of
the grand jury came with other concepts of the common law.2" It has
been said that the grand jury is made part of our judicial process by
the federal constitution, 2' but at least as far as the states are con14 Ibid.
15Ibid.

18 Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv. 101, 114 (1931).
17 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
18 EDWARDS,

op. cit. supra note 12, at 27.

19 Id. at 27-28. See generally, 1 HOLDSWORTH, A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

312-27

(7th ed. 1957).
2o Id. at 31. The Constitution of the United States contained no guarantee of indictment by grand jury, but the fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger." This of course applies
only to prosecutions of the federal government. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not guarantee the right of indictment by grand jury to those
prosecuted by state governments. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) ; State
v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382 (1893), aff'd 164 U.S. 705 (1896). The majority cited these cases in recognition of this proposition.
The racial discrimination cases, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939), have in part undermined this rule. They declare that
systematic exclusion of people from grand jury service on the basis of race or color is
prejudicial to the accused, if the accused is also a member of the excluded class. Unless
the grand jurors are representative of the community at large, the accused is denied
due process.
21 United States v. Cobbledick, 309 U.S. 323, 342 (1940).
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cemed, it is a creature of local law. Language appearing in United
States v. Central Supply Ass'n22 reflects, for whatever it is worth, a
generally accepted rule in this country. "Persons aciused have a right
to insist that the grand jury which indicted them should have been
duly impaneled and conducted according to law. Beyond that they
have no rights as far as the grand jury is concerned." 2 The justification for this idea is the same as that of the old common law judges,
i.e., all the grand jury can do is present an indictment after which
the defendant will have ample opportunity to present his defense to
the trial jury. Notice how this thinking has been carried through from
the fourteenth century, kept alive by cases, now to become verbalized by the majority opinion in the Beck case as part of the law of
Washington.
In 1933 Parliament abolished the grand jury in England.24 Cries
for similar action in this country have arisen from time to time. Words
enunciated as far back as 1825 by Jeremy Bentham have been taken
up and given new life. For example, in Blake v. State2." it is said that
the grand jury is under modem conditions an "antiquated and wellnigh useless" part of judicial procedure.2 ' Defenders of the institution have stated that the grand jury is the conserver-of liberties, and
"the noblest check upon malice and oppression of individuals...,?28

Those who advocate continued use of the grand jury rely on the pro-tection it affords the accused to support their argument."
It would be impractical for the purposes of this Note to analyze all
of the authorities cited in the Beck case, but the more important ones
should be examined in order to trace and evaluate the reasoning of
the two opinions. In short, a precedential analysis will be undertaken.
The cases cited by the majority will be examined first.
In re Grand Jury Proceedingss° is cited for the proposition that the
F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
at 244.
24
Administration of Justices Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. V, c.36 § 1.
25
Bentham stated in 1825 that the grand jury had outlived its usefulness for over a
century. 3 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDFNCE, ch. 15 § 11, cited in OaRFI,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 140 (1947).
26 540 Okla. Crim. 62, 14 P.2d 240 (1932).
27 Id. at 65, 14 P.2d at 242.
28 EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 1.
20 For example this statement appears in McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Inry,
26 M NN. L. Rav. 153 (1942) at 157: "[Alt this time, when rights of individuals have
been completely subordinated to the will of the executive in many countries, and when
fears are expressed in our own counitry that the expansion of the executive power is
endangering the rights of the individual, it would be the height of folly to make an
attempt to eliminate [the grand jury] ...so long as any substantial part of the people
continue to regard it as a bulwark against executive tyranny."
8o 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933). This case involved a petition to vacate an order
2234

23Id.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

most valuable function a grand jury performs today is its inquisitorial
function."' The notion that the grand jury is a protection of the accused is resigned to antiquity by the majority in the Beck case; the
use of the grand jury is viewed in its modern posture. The question
in In re Grand Jury Proceedingsinvolved the power of the grand jury
to subpoena witnesses and garner testimony. The case is not authoritative with regard to a question pertaining to the relations between
a grand jury and an accused. It is noteworthy that the fact pattern
involved was reminiscent of Hale v. Henkel" where the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the grand jury stood between the prosecutor and the accused.
The majority stated that the functions of the grand jury are investigative and not judicial, 3 citing State v. Lawler." There is language
appearing in United States v. Cobbledick3" which could hardly be more
contrary to this view. It is there said that a "proceeding before 3a6
grand jury constitutes a judicial inquiry of the most ancient lineage.
In Washington, the constitution indicates that only a judge can order
a grand jury." They cannot convene themselves or be convened by
the prosecutor. It would seem that a body directed, instructed, and
to some degree controlled by the court calling it into existence has
some relation to the judiciary. The problem is, in any event one of
selecting a label and is not determinative of anything. Grand juries
will do what grand juries have always done regardless of the label
attached to their function.
A quotation was taken from In re Kittle38 which was written by
Judge Learned Hand. As cited, the quotation reads: "[The grand
granting government attorneys the use of certain testimony given in grand jury proceedings. It was claimed that the government's objective was to obtain the testimony
for use in another action. The petition was denied because sufficient cause was shown
to call the witness.
31 155 Wash. Dec. at 567, 349 P.2d at 388.
32 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
33 155 Wash. Dec. at 567, 349 P.2d at 388.
3-1221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W. 65 (1936). This case is also cited in relation to the
proposition that a court's charge to a grand jury is not subject to judicial review.
155 Wash. Dec. at 571, 349 P.2d at 390-91. The Wisconsin statutes provide that a
grand jury is not bound by the court's instruction; therefore an indictment cannot be
quashed if the instructions are incorrect. According to the Wisconsin court, if erroneous
instructions were given it is presumed that the jurors separated the good law from the
bad, since they are the judge of the law as well as the facts. It was recognized that
there is a shady line between giving mere bad law and showing prejudice by relating
an opinion. If the court gives an opinion, the remarks are beyond the pale of instructions and presumably the indictment can be quashed.
3.- 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
36 Id. at 327.
87 WASH. CONST. art. I § 26.
33 180 Fed. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).

1961]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960

jury] ...is the voice of the community accusing its members ... ,Il
The last clause was omitted which read "and the only protection from.
such accusation is in the conscience of that tribunal."'" It is possible to
interpret these words in this manner: Since the fate of the accused,
that is, whether he will be faced with an indictment or reprieved by a
"no bill," rests in the conscience of the grand jurors, his only protection
is that they will act freely, without bias or prejudice and according to
their good conscience. Read in this fashion the quotation is favorable
to the view of the dissenters. Notice that Judge Hand's reference to
the grand jury as a "tribunal" could be interpreted as indicating a
view that the grand jury performs judicial acts. This would be contrary to the majority's language previously indicated.
The Kittle case actually involved the question of secrecy of the
grand jury proceeding and is inappropriate here. The case is cited in
Beck for the proposition that the grand jury should not be handicapped
or delayed because those appearing before it have been subjected to
adverse publicity. 1 The appellant argued that under such circumstances greater care must be taken to insure that grand jurors represent
the community voice. To accomplish this, it was said, prospective
grand jurors should be interrogated for bias and prejudice. The
majority interpreted the argument as suggesting that the more notoriety an accused draws upon himself the more he becomes immune
from grand jury investigation, and emphatically rejected it. 2 The fact
that the prosecutor could have proceeded on an information as an
alternative was not considered relevant here.
United States v. Knowles"3 was cited as authority for the view that,
so 155 Wash. Dec. at 567-68, 349 P2d at 393.

40 The majority did include this clause at another place in the opinion. 155 Wash.
Dec. at 574, 349 P.2d at 392.
41155 Wash. Dec. at 568, 349 P.2d at 388-89. Kittle is also cited for the proposition
that little control can be exercised over grand jury proceedings. Id at 574, 349 P.2d
at 392. Another quotation is used which states: "We took the institution as we found
it in our English inheritance, and he best serves the constitution who most faithfully
follows its historical significance, not he who by a verbal pedantry tries a priori to
formulate its limitations and its extent." Id. at 575, 349 P.2d at 393. The use of this
language is especially interesting since, as noted previously, the historical significance
of the grand jury as a body standing between the accused and the prosecutor was disregarded. It appears that the majority is of the opinion that powers of the grand jury
should not be tampered with, since in this respect, we must take the institution as we
received it from our English ancestors. But modem considerations, not indicated in
detail, force abandonment of protections historically afforded the accused.
42 155 Wash. Dec. at 568, 349 P.2d at 388-89.
43 147 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1957). This case involved an indictment on a charge of
contempt of congress. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that fourteen of the twenty-three members of the grand jury were employed either by
the United States or the District of Columbia. It was alleged that independent judgment could not be rendered because of fear of investigation under an executive order
relating to national security. The court denied the motion and affirmed the decision.
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barring statutory provision to the contrary, bias or prejudice on the
part of grand jurors is not a ground for quashing the indictment, since
the grand jury only accuses.'" In Knowles it was observed that the
sixth amendment requires that (petit) jurors be impartial, but no such
requirement is included in the fifth amendment relating to grand jurors.
From this observation it was concluded that the framers of the federal
constitution did not intend the requirement that grand jurors be impartial. This reasoning is, of course, applicable only to grand jury
proceedings in relation to a prosecution by federal authorities."5 With
respect to grand jury proceedings conducted by state authorities, considerations of the fifth and sixth amendments of the federal constitution
are irrelevant, and so is Knowles. The idea that statutory provisions
are controlling is very important, however, and will be discussed later.
Coblentz v. State"' is also cited for the proposition that absent a
statute, jurors are not required to be without prejudice. It was there
recognized, however, that an extreme case could arise where prejudice
was so great that indictment and conviction could not be upheld. The
aid which can be drawn from Coblentz seems to be that there are degrees of prejudice, the extreme of which might be called incompetence;
and that statutory provisions are in any event the controlling factor.
United States v. Rintelen" indicated that an indictment cannot be
quashed merely because some of the grand jurors are prejudiced. The
majority quoted from the case as follows: "an intelligent grand juror
can hardly be found who has not decided opinions derived from his
general knowledge as to any case of public notoriety.... The question
is not what his feelings were, but whether he voted for an indictment
155 Wash. Dec. at 568, 349 P2d at 389.
Cf., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908) ; Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833).
46 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933). The defendant was convicted of having accepted
a deposit of money as president of a banking institution with the knowledge that the
bank was insolvent. Nine of the grand jurors were members of a trust company which
had previously merged with the bank and all suffered financial losses as a result of the
bank's insolvency. The foreman of the grand jury had publicly declared hostility to the
defendant and had accused him of fraud. On appeal the court said that no statute required that grand jurors be impartial. It was said that possible cases could arise where
the grand jurors would be incompetent to serve because of interest, but mere prejudice
resulting from financial loss was insufficient. The case was reversed on other grounds.
47 155 Wash. Dec. at 569, 349 P.2d at 389.
48 235 Fed. 787 (D.C.N.Y. 1916). The indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to foment strikes in munitions factories for the purpose of restraining the export
of munitions to foreign countries in time of war. One ground for plea in abatement was
that the grand jurors were actuated by a strong temper and prejudice against the defendants as the result of false statements and vicious newspaper publications. There
was no allegation that any grand juror would have voted differently had the publications not been made so the plea was overruled.
44
45

19611

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960

'
honestly and upon competent evidence."49
The first sentence of this
quotation is a good capsule summary of the argument of the dissenters.
The second sentence reflects the question that the appellant argues
should have been asked of the grand jurors. Rintelen dealt primarily
with the question of misconduct of a prosecutor. A district attorney
stated to the grand jury that he desired to have the defendants indicted.
The court held that this did not amount to misconduct, although it
recognized that a fine line exists between acceptable persuasive conduct and unacceptable prejudicial misconduct.
The cases cited by the dissenting opinion can be disposed of with
less discussion. The language of State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior
Court" is the chief authority relied upon for the proposition that an
unbiased grand jury is required."' The majority easily distinguished
the case by saying that it relates only to the impanelment of a grand
jury and not to the procedures used thereafter.52
The remainder of the opinion deals with the questions of prejudice
occasioned by the charge of the court and misconduct of the prosecutor
during the proceedings. At this point we see that the court is at odds
with itself as to just what the problems are, since the majority did not
consider these points material. The dissenters on the other hand,
devoted little argument to the proposition that the grand jury's function is to stand between the accused and the prosecutor.
Fuller v. State 3 is referred to by the dissenters in relation to the

40 155 Wash. Dec. at 569, 349 P.2d at 389.
50 82 Wash. 284, 144 Pac. 32 (1914). In Murphy, a superior court judge reduced the
jury list from seventy-eight to forty names because of disqualifications for incompetence
or other reasons. From the group of forty names the judge selected seventeen for the
grand jury. There was no statute specifically regulating the selection of grand jurors;
however, there was a provision relating to the selection of petit jurors, requiring essentionally selection by chance. On appeal it was declared, in effect, that grand jurors
must be selected in the same manner as petit jurors. The court indicated that the same
reasons which compel selection of an unbiased petit jury exist with respect to selection
of a grand jury. Even though no real injustice was shown, the court thought that the
trial judge should not follow this practice and remanded the whole proceeding, directing selection of grand jurors from jury lists by chance.
State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P.2d 160 (1936), is cited by the dissenters as
approving Murphy. 155 Wash. Dec. at 608, 349 P2d at 412. It actually limited Murphy, but is of little value here in any event. Guthrie merely said that a judge can
excuse grand jurors after selection as long as they are replaced by others from the
jury list.
sZ 155 Wash. Dec. at 608, 349 P.2d at 412.
52 Id. at 574, 349 P.2d at 392. If no importance is attached to the grand jury proceeding, and a subsequent fair trial wipes the slate clean, why should there be any concern about impaneling the jury? What purpose is served by having rigid rules pertaining to selection of jurors if any conduct is condoned during the proceedings?
53 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749 (1905). The defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling liquor. After the grand jury was impaneled the court said, "Have you never heard
the name of Charlie Fuller?" The trial court's denial of a motion to quash the indictment was reversed. It was felt that directing attention to a particular individual in
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point that a court's charge to the grand jury may be prejudicial and
create bias in the minds of the jurors." In Beck the charge did refer
to the hearings previously held by the Senate Rackets Committee. 5
The dissenters felt that the judge's comments gave a veneer of authenticity to the unrelated charges and the accompanying publicity instead
of directing attention to the specific evidence produced in the proceedings. Consequently bias was created in the minds of the grand jurors,
and the accused was deprived of his presumption of innocence.5" Although the position of the dissenters is a realistic one, it can be attacked
on two grounds. First, the argument of the majority that the accused
is protected by a subsequent fair trial encompasses the issue, and that
argument is not met by the dissenters. Second, the Fuller case is not
very persuasive support. It has lost its virility in its own jurisdiction.
In Wheeler v. State57 it was declared that bias created in the minds of
grand jurors by the court's remarks was insufficient to merit quashing
of the indictment. The court indicated that an indictment would be
quashed only if the court's charge constituted dictation or coercion. A
lone dissenter relied on Fuller. Since the conduct of the court in the
Beck grand jury proceedings could hardly be characterized as coercive,
the dissenters are left without doctrinal support for their position.
United States v. Wells58 was cited for the proposition that the prosecutor must limit his conduct to advising jurors and examining witnesses
and should not express opinions or make arguments.5 It is noteworthy
that the majority incorrectly distinguished this case on the ground that
it involved a question of interference with the grand jury's deliberations."0 A careful reading of the opinion in Wells will disclose that the
prosecutor's misconduct was the basis for quashing the indictment. It
was not essential that Wells be distinguished, since, even if misconduct on the part of the prosecution is assumed, it is subject to the
same weakness indicated above in relation to the Fuller case, i.e.,
the argument that the accused is protected by a subsequent fair trial.
such a manner attributed a notoriety to the accused which must have biased the minds
of the grand jurors.
54
155 Wash. Dec. at 610-11, 349 P.2d at 413.
55
Id. at 605-06, 349 P.2d at 410-11.
56 Id. at 610-11, 349 P.2d at 413-14.
57219 Miss. 129, 63 So. 2d 517 (1953).
58 163 Fed. 313 (D.C. Idaho 1908). In Wells the prosecutor presented his facts to
the grand jury and then, without allowing deliberation, induced them to sign the indictment. The indictment was quashed on appeal since the court felt that the conduct of
the prosecutor was prejudicial. However, the court did say that mere presence of the
prosecutor during deliberations would not compel quashing the indictment.
59
60 155 Wash. Dec. at 613, 349 P.2d at 415.
Id. at 573, 349 P.2d at 391.
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Commonwealth v. Bane"' can be attacked in the same manner. It also
appears to be a misconduct case where the indictment was quashed
because of the actions of the prosecutor before the grand jury. It was
thought to be almost directly in point by the dissenters but its persuasiveness is weakened by its obscurity.
Examination of the important cases cited by the two opinions suggests the conclusion that the ultimate legal problem is one of statutory
interpretation. Most of the cases recognize the principle that the
nature of grand jury proceedings and the protections afforded the
accused depend upon the existence and substance of statutory provisions.
RCW 10.28.01062 and RCW 10.28.030"8 allow challenges to the
panel of grand jurors and to individual grand jurors. RCW 10.28.010
provides that challenges to the panel of grand jurors shall be allowed
"to any person in custody or held to answer for an offense." The majority declared that this requirement attached to RCW 10.28.030 also
and that since the appellant was not so held, he did not come within
either provision. Consequently, an impartial grand jury was not required."' The majority goes on to say that RCW 10.28.1305 fortifies
their conclusion since it is incumbent upon grand jurors to testify of
their own knowledge.
The interpretation given these statutes raises some questions. The
construction given RCW 10.28.030 results in the inescapable conclusion that those held in custody or held to answer for an offense have a
protection not afforded those simply called before a grand jury and
then accused by indictment. The former have the guarantee of an
impartial grand jury; the latter do not. This classification may not
be sufficiently reasonable to withstand charges of denial of equal protection of the laws, and it also raises the question of whether the court
should so construe the statute.
a' Cited

by the court as 39 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 664.

62 "Challenge to panel. Challenges to the panel of grand jurors shall be allowed to

any person in custody or held to answer for an offense, when the clerk has not drawn
from the jury box the requisite number of ballots to constitute a grand jury or when
the drawing was not done in the presence of the proper officers; and such challenges
shall be in writing and verified by affidavit and proved to the satisfaction of the court."
63 "Challenge to individual juror. Challenges to individual grand jurors may be
made by such person for reason of want of qualification to sit as such juror; and when,
in the opinion of the court, a state of mind exists in the juror, such as would render
him unable to act impartially and without prejudice."
64 155 Wash. Dec. at 570, 349 P2d at 390.
05 "Jurors to communicate personal knowledge of offenses. If a member of a grand
jury knows, or has reason to believe, that a public offense, triable within the county,
has been committed, he must declare the same to his fellow jurors, who may thereupon
investigate the same if a majority so order."
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Another question is raised by the majority's reading of RCW 10.28.140.6" This statute is cited in relation to the proposition that grand
jurors are required to bring their knowledge and prejudices with them
and reveal any information that they have.67 But if they do testify,
they are prevented from joining in the deliberation. This then, is really
a protection against having a biased member on the grand jury. There
is no reason why a grand juror could not testify and then rejoin the
deliberation, unless the drafters of the statute intended to safeguard
the grand jury from a biased member.
The dissenters would not restrict the application of RCW 10.28.030
to those already in custody or held to answer for an offense. They
assume that an impartial grand jury has always been required in this
state, citing Watts v. Washington Territory.6" They declare that the
statutes "clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to adopt the principle that the grand jury must be impartial and unprejudiced." 9 Their
conclusions are not documented with authority.
There is one federal case which reflects an idea which could have
germinated a compromising thought in the minds of the judges in the
Beck case. The case is Atwell v. United States"0 and the idea is this:
No indictment having been found by a properly impaneled grand jury
should be disturbed for minor violations of procedure in the grand
jury hearing. If the prosecution is slightly overzealous, if the court's
charge is not quite correct, or if one or two of the jurors are shown to
be slightly biased, as long as no great error is committed, the indictment should not be overturned. But, as the court stated, as the violations increase and become persistent and general, "the law and society
71
are threatened with anarchy, and judges are not impotent to act,"1
and in a proper case, should overturn the indictment, in order to protect citizens from vindictive prosecutions by the government, or political partisans, or private enemies. Each of the cases cited in the two
opinions can be reconciled if read with this idea in mind. The courts
66 "Complainant not to take part. No complainant who may institute a prosecution
shall be competent to be present at the deliberations of a grand jury, or vote, for the
finding of an indictment."
67 155 Wash. Dec. at 570, 349 P.2d at 390.
68 1 Wash. Terr. 409 (1872). This case is mentioned by the dissenters as indicative
of an early idea that bias or prejudice on the part of grand jurors, if shown, may be
ground for reversal. 155 Wash. Dec. at 608, 349 P.2d at 412. The Watts opinion
indicates that no allegation of bias was made. The court mentioned this only in passing: "What were these objections? ... not that any of [the grand jurors] ... had any
prejudice or bias . . ." 1 Wash. Terr. 409, 413 (1872).
69 155 Wash. Dec. at 608, 349 P.2d at 412.
70 162 Fed. 97 (1908).
71 Id. at 99.
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have considered the seriousness of the violation, the inflammatory
nature of the case, the effect of allowing violations to go unchecked,
and the effect of allowing one convicted by a petit jury to escape on a
legal technicality. After balancing all factors they have reached varying results, but always with the recognition that a fine line exists when
competing social interests are involved.
The majority in the Beck case did not seem to recognize that the
seriousness of the violations alleged was an important consideration.
The dissenters assumed that an impartial grand jury was required but
failed to show clearly why a subsequent fair trial did not provide
sufficient protection for the appellant.
The decision-making process does not take place in a vacuum, and
it would be a mistake to assume that extra-legal considerations did not
affect the result in the Beck case. The judges were aware of the publicity, the prominence of the appellant, the questionable utility of the
grand jury hearing as a prosecutor's alternative in the future, and the
possible public indignation should Mr. Beck go unpunished. Caught
on the horns of a dilemma, the judges saw their challenge differently,
and their individual consciences prompted them to select different
social interests to protect. The result was two opinions with different
abstractions of doctrine from the body of case law, and different interpretations of the applicable statutes. The role of precedent was
actually of negligible effect as a determinative of the result in the Beck
case. The judges did the best with what they had, but the simple fact
of the matter is, none of the authorities was controlling. In terms of
doctrine, both opinions are vulnerable to attack; but criticism of either
side can only be made in terms of policy. The United States Supreme
LLOYD W. PETERSON
Court will have the final word. 2
If the Supreme Court applies
72 Certiorari was granted 81 Sup. Ct. 900 (1961).
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957) beyond the specific facts of those cases to
the Beck case, it may reverse. Those cases indicated that state action which is arbitrary and thereby offends the dictates of reason, violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court served notice that it intends to guard
against all arbitrary action by the states. This Supreme Court doctrine should be juxtaposed with the following quotations from the Beck case.
"The end result of a grand jury's deliberations is not a judgment and sentence, but
merely a charge; consequently, the concepts of procedural due process do not apply to
the grand jury, except as they may be necessary to prevent prejudice to an accused or
a witness in subsequent proceedings... ." 155 Wash. Dec. at 567, 349 P.2d at 388.
"Investigative agencies--city, county, state, or Federal--do not wait for the hue and
cry to die down before they begin to investigate or to file a charge against an accused.
Nor do we see why a grand jury investigation should be handicapped or delayed because of publicity of whatever kind or character." 155 Wash. Dec. at 568, 349 P.2d

at 389.

"In [directing the grand jury] .., it was proper for the court to make notes of facts

